Algebraic Semantics and Mixed Validities. A Reply to Cotnoir

Andrea Strollo

Abstract


Alethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. Such a view has been challenged to make sense of the standard account of validity as necessary truth preservation. In this paper, the recent solution elaborated by Aaron Cotnoir, based on an algebraic approach, is shown to be untenable. Some reflections about the relation of logical many-valuedness with truth pluralism are also discussed.


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