Validity in a dialetheist framework

Diego Tajer, Federico Pailos

Abstract


In this paper, we develop two theories of validity in a dialetheist framework, both based on Meadows (2014). The first one, $LPV^{*}$, has LP's consequence relation but the validity predicate of Meadows' fixed-point construction. The second theory, DT (the one we favour), has a logical consequence defined in terms of its validity predicate. Therefore, in DT, the validity predicate and the consequence relation coincide. Moreover, this theory, unlike Meadows' VAL, is reflexive.

References


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Beall, JC. and Murzi, J. (2013) 'Two flavors of Curry's pradox', Journal of Philosophy 110(3), 143-165.

Ketland, J. (2012) 'Validity as a primitive', Analysis 72(3), 421-430.

Kripke, S. (1975) 'Outline of a theory of truth', Journal of Philosophy 72(19), 690-716.

Meadows, T. (2014) 'Fixed points for Consequence Relations', Logique et Analyse 57(227), 333-357.

Priest, G. (2006) In contradiction, Oxford University Press, Oxford.


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