Logical Disputes and the a Priori

Graham Priest


In this paper, I propose a general model for the rational resolution

of disputes about logic, and discuss a number of its features. These

include its dispensing with a traditional notion of the a priori in logic,

and some objections to which this might give rise.


Bealer, G. (1996), ‘A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy’

and ‘A Priori Knowledge: Replies to William Lycan and Ernest Sosa’,

Philosophical Studies, 81: 121-142 and 163-174.

Boghossian, P. (2000), ‘Knowledge of Logic’, pp. 229-54 of P. Boghossian

and C. Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the a Priori, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.

BonJour, L. (1998), In Defence of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Carroll, L. (1895), ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’, Mind 4: 278-80.

Harman, G. (1986), Change of View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge

MA: MIT Press.

Mares, E. (2011), A Priori, Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University


Priest, G. (1979), ‘Two Dogmas of Quineanism’, Philosophical Quarterly,

: 289-30l.

Priest, G. (1989), ‘Classical Logic Aufgehoben’, ch. 4 of G. Priest, R.

Routley, and J. Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the

Inconsistent, Munich: Philosophia Verlag.

Priest, G. (2006), Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University


Priest, G. (2014), ‘Revising Logic’, ch. 12 of P. Rush (ed.), The Metaphysics

of Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quine, W. V. O. (1951), ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, Philosophical

Review, 60: 20–43; reprinted as pp. 20-46 of From a Logical Point of

View, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Quine, W. V. O. (1970), Philosophy of Logic, Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice Hall.

Quine, W. V. O., and Ullian, J. S. (1978), The Web of Belief, 2nd. ed.,

New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Wason, P. C., and Johnson-Laird, P. (1972), Psychology of Reasoning:

Structure and Content, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil


Wright, C. (1986), ‘Inventing Logical Necessity’, pp. 187-209 of J. Butterfield

(ed.), Language, Mind and Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University


Wright, C. (2004), ‘Intuition, Entitlement, and the Epistemology of Logical

Laws’, Dialectica 58: 155-75.

Wright, C. (2007), ‘Basic (Propositional) Knowledge of (Truths of)

Logic’, Arché Seminar Paper, University of St Andrews.


  • There are currently no refbacks.