Truth, knowledge, and presupposition

Adam Grobler

Abstract


A novel analysis of knowledge is offered. The idea is to use the logic of presupposition and replace the truth requirement with the non-falsity requirement in the tripartite definition of knowledge. This move can be used to explain the difference between outdated knowledge and mere superstition and to solve some problems about epistemic closure. In this regard, it is claimed that the present proposal improves upon Nozick's conditional theory of knowledge and Dretske's relevant alternatives approach and avoids disadvantages of antirealism. Some applications are mentioned e.g. to elucidating Wittgenstein's and Wisniewski's anti-skeptical strategies, or to removing circularities from reliabilism. Finally, further possible developments that employ the concepts of Wisniewski's theory of erotetic arguments are indicated.

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