Modelling truthmaking

Greg Restall


According to one tradition in realist philosophy, ÔtruthmakingÕ amounts to necessitation. That is, an object x is a truthmaker for the claim A if x exists, and the existence of x necessitates the truth of A.
I argued in my paper "Truthmakers, Entailment and Necessity"Ó" [14], that if we wish to use this account of truthmaking, we ought understand the entailment connective "=>" in such a claim as a relevant entailment, in the tradition of Anderson and Belnap and their co-workers [1, 2, 8, 11]. Furthermore, I proposed a number of theses about truthmaking as necessitation. The most controversial of these is the disjunction thesis: x makes a disjunction A v B true if and only if it makes one of the disjuncts (A or B) true.
That paper left one important task unfinished. I did not explain how the theses about truthmaking could be true together. In this paper I give a consistency proof, by providing a model for the theses of truthmaking in my earlier paper. This result does two things. First, it shows that the theses of truthmaking are jointly consistent. Second, it provides an independently philosophically motivated formal model for relevant logics in the Ôpossible worldsÕ tradition of Routley and Meyer [8, 16, 17].

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