A game-theoretic logic of norms and actions

Martin van Hees


Both rational choice theorists and logicians have made important contributions to the formal analysis of (legal) norms. However, the results from the logic of norms -deontic logic- did not have much impact on the rational choice approach to the analysis of individual rights nor did the work of rational choice theorists have much influence on the development of deontic logic. This paper presents the basic outlines of the models presented in (Van Hees 1995) in which it is shown that a fruitful synthesis of the two lines of research is possible. The semantics of deontic logic and action logic is usually given in terms of a Kripke model of possible worlds with a primitive binary relation R between the worlds. We show how such a relation R can be defined game-theoretically, hence achieving a synthesis between logic and game theory.

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